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There have been several battles near the city of Ravenna in the Italian Peninsula:

• Battle of Ravenna (419), between the Roman Empire and the Ostrogoths.
• Battle of Ravenna (432), between competing factions in the Western Roman Empire.
• Battle of Ravenna (476), in which Odoacer captured Ravenna and brought the Western Roman Empire to an end.
• Battle of Ravenna (729), between the Byzantine Empire and the Italians.
• Battle of Ravenna (1512), between the French and Spanish during the War of the League of Cambrai.

Battle of Ravenna (1512) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search
This article is about the 1512 battle; see Battle of Ravenna for other battles fought at this location.
Battle of Ravenna Part of the War of the League of Cambrai
The Death of Gaston de Foix in the Battle of Ravenna on 11 April 1512 (oil on canvas by Ary Scheffer, c. 1824) Date April 11, 1512 Location Near Ravenna, present-day Italy Result French/Ferrarese victory Belligerents France,
Duchy of Ferrara Spain,
Papal States Commanders Gaston de Foix † Ramón de Cardona Strength ~23,000 ~16,000 Casualties and losses ~3,000–4,500 killed,
~4,500 wounded ~9,000 killed,
? wounded [show] v • d • e

War of the League ofCambrai
Agnadello – Padua – Polesella – Mirandola – Brescia – Ravenna – St. Mathieu – Novara – Guinegate – Flodden Field – La Motta – Marignano
[show] v • d • e

Italian Wars 1494–98 – 1499–1504 – League of Cambrai – Urbino – 1521–26 – League of Cognac – 1536–38 – 1542–46 – 1551–59
The Battle of Ravenna, fought on April 11, 1512, by forces of the Holy League and France, was a major battle of the War of the League of Cambrai in the Italian Wars.It was an overwhelming victory for the French; however, it wasunsuccessful in helping them secure northern Italy, since they would beforced to withdraw from the region entirely by August 1512.
Contents [hide]

• 1 Prelude
• 2 Battle
  • 2.1 Dispositions
  • 2.2 Artillery exchange
  • 2.3 Cavalry engagements
  • 2.4 Infantry attack
  • 2.5 Endgame
• 3 Aftermath
• 4 Historiography
• 5 Notes
• 6 References
• 7 Further reading

[edit] PreludeBeginning in February 1512, the French forces in Italy, newly commanded by Gaston de Foix, Duc de Nemours, had been engaged in capturing cities in the Romagna and the Veneto,in an attempt to deny control of those regions to the forces of theHoly League. Although he had been successful in a number of sieges,Nemours was aware that the impending invasion of France by Henry VIII of Englandwould cause much of his army to be withdrawn, and he was determined toforce the main army of the Holy League into battle before thatoccurred. Thus, in late March, Nemours, together with an Italiancontingent under Alfonso I d'Este, Duke of Ferrara, marched east from Bologna and laid siege to the city of Ravenna, which was defended by Papal troops.
Julius II, alarmed at the prospect of losing his last stronghold in the Romagna, demanded that an army be sent to relieve the city; Ramón de Cardona had to comply, and the Spanish army set out for Ravenna with a company of Papal troops in tow. By April 9, they had passed Forlì, and were advancing north along the Ronco Rivertowards the city, and on the next day had reached Molinaccio, only amile south of the French positions, but still separated from them bythe Ronco. Nemours, short on supplies and increasingly anxious to givebattle before he was forced to withdraw from Italy, ordered a generalattack for the following day.
[edit] Battle[edit] DispositionsThe strengths, relative positions, and commanders of the componentelements of both armies are unclear, and different arrangements aregiven by historians.[1]The French army formed up in an arc to the east of Cardona's fortifiedcamp; closest to the river were about 900 heavy cavalry of the"vaward", under Jacques de La Palice and Alfonso d'Este.[2] Next to this cavalry was the bulk of the infantry. According to Charles Oman, it consisted of three separate units: 3,500 Gascon crossbowmen, 5,000 landsknechts under Jacob Empser, and 3,000 Picards and Gascons under Thomas Bohier, the Seneschal of Normandy.[3]Frederick Taylor groups the infantry into only two units: 9,500landsknechts under Empser and 8,000 "Gascon archers and Picard pikemen"under the Seigneur de Molart.[4]The heavy cavalry of the "main-battle", consisting of 780 men, wascommanded by either Bohier alone, or by Bohier together with the Vicomte de Lautrec, Louis d'Ars, and the Chevalier de Bayard.[5]This cavalry occupied one of two positions: according to Oman andThomas Arnold, it was placed in the arc to the left of the Frenchinfantry, while Taylor has it behind the cavalry of the "vaward", nextto the river.[6]Farther to the left of the French line—beyond the cavarly of the"main-battle", according to Arnold and Oman, or directly flanking theinfantry, according to Taylor—was the "rearward" corps of the army,commanded by Yves d'Alégre.[7] It consisted of about 4,000 mostly Italian infantry under Frederigo de Bozzolo, flanked, on the extreme left, by about 2,000 light cavalry under Gian Bernardo Caracciolo.[8]

The arrangement of the Holy League army is similarly a matter ofdispute; Oman comments that "the array of Cardona's army, thoughelaborately described by more than one narrator, is not very easy tomake out."[9]At the north end of the camp, near the river, was the cavalry of the"vaward", consisting of about 670 Papal heavy cavalry under Fabrizio Colonna.[10]Farther along the river were twvo more bodies of heavy cavalry: the"main-battle", consisting of 565 men under the Marquis of La Palude,and the rearguard, consisting of 490 men under Alfonso Carvajal.[11]

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Taylor divides the Holy League infantry into four blocks: three divisions of Spanish infantry, each consisting of four colunellasof 500–600 men each, and one formation of Papal infantry, numberingabout 2,000, all under the general command of Pedro Navarro; Taylorplaces the formations of infantry in a deep column parallel to theriver, on the far side of the cavalry, and perpendicular to theentrenchments.[12]Oman and Arnold place the infantry in three lines running along thelength of the entrenchements; no number is given for the first ofthese, but the second is given as consisting of 4,000 men, and thethird, placed as a reserve, as including "three Spanish foot regiments"as well as the 2,000 Papal infantry.[13]Beyond the infantry—to the far side of it from the river, according toTaylor, or at the end of its line, according to Oman and Arnold—was thelight cavalry, consisting of 1,500–1,700 Spanish ginetes and Italian mounted arquebusiers under the command of Fernando d'Avalos, Marquis of Pescara.[14]
[edit] Artillery exchangeThe advancing French troops halted about two hundred paces from the enemy lines.[15]The sporadic exchange of artillery fire that had been taking placesince the French had begun to cross the Ronco now developed into afull-scale artillery duel between the two armies that lasted more thantwo hours.[16]A new tactic, the open-field exchange of artillery fire was "the mostviolent cannonade between armies in the field that the world had yetseen", according to Taylor, and "the first of its kind in thehistorical record", according to Bert Hall.[17]
De Foix placed the bulk of his artillery in front of the French right wing, directing its fire into the Holy League's camp.[18]Navarro ordered his infantry to take cover—the troops hid in thetrenches, or lay prone on the slopes of the river embankments—butColonna's heavy cavalry had no shelter available, and began to takeheavy casualties from the cannonfire.[19]The Spanish artillery, meanwhile, ignored the French cavalry andconcentrated its fire on the massed Gascons and landsknechts in theFrench center.[20]The Spanish fire was, according to Oman, "excessively murderous", andcasualties among the French infantry were substantial; as many as 2,000men were killed, and the Gascons were so shaken by the fire that thelandsknechts were forced to push them back with pikes in order to keepthem in line.[21]
Not content with bombarding the camp from one side, the French moved to enfilade it from the flanks.[22]The Duke of Ferarra, who had apparently been acting independently ofthe main army since the crossing of the Ronco, had moved twenty-four ofhis cannon around the rear of the French position, finally bringingthem up on the left flank, facing Pescara's light cavalry.[23]From this position, d'Este's guns inflicted heavy casualties on Pescaraand Carvajal's cavalry; so intense was the fire that some of itovershot the camp, inflicting casualties on the French troops on theother side.[24]Yves d'Alègre, meanwhile, had devised a similar plan on the otherflank; re-crossing the Ronco with two heavy guns, he positioned themacross the river from the Spanish camp—directly to the rear ofColonna's position.[25] The fire of these two guns inflicted massive casualties on Colonna's closely-packed cavalry, finally forcing his hand.[26]
[edit] Cavalry engagementsThe target of the Spanish attack was the main French cavalryformation, which stood closest to the river, at the end of the Frenchline. The first attack was made by the Spanish rearguard, and was sodisorganized that it disintegrated prior to reaching the French. Soonafterwards, the main body of Spanish heavy cavalry, supported by thelight cavalry under the Fernando d'Avalos, marquis of Pescara, engaged the French gendarmesunder de Foix. This quickly became a general cavalry melee as furtherreinforcements arrived to both forces. The Spanish vanguard, under Fabrizio Colonna, attempted to flank the French, but was engaged and destroyed by Jacques de la Palice,who then joined the main cavalry fight. At this point, much of theremaining Spanish cavalry broke and fled back into the camp, from whichthey retreated south towards Forlì, accompanied by de Cardona, who hadavoided taking part in the fighting.
[edit] Infantry attackThe Spanish infantry, meanwhile, had remained inside theirentrenchements in their camp, Navarro having refused to follow Colonnaout. Here they became the target of an advance by the French infantry,comprised mainly of landsknechts and Gasconarchers. Navarro split his forces, sending part of them, together withthe Papal infantry, along the embankment of the Ronco, where they brokethe Gascon line, and were making considerable headway before beingforced to retreat by the arrival of some French cavalry. The main bodyof Spanish infantry engaged the landsknechts, with the Spanish swordsmenmoving under their pikes and causing considerable carnage. Colonna, whohad returned from the cavalry battle, attacked the rear of the Frenchformation with what remained of his cavalry, and the pikemen began tobreak and retreat from the camp.
[edit] EndgameAt this point, the French cavalry attacked the Spanish from alldirections. The Spanish infantry broke under the assault; and whileseveral thousand managed to reach the riverbank and retreat along it,the majority were killed, and both Colonna and Navarro were takenprisoner. Gaston de Foix, meanwhile, had been informed of the Gasconretreat and had ridden north with a small cavalry detachment. On theembankment, he encountered a company of Spanish infantry trying toretreat, and was killed in the ensuing melee.
[edit] AftermathFollowing the death of Gaston de Foix, command of the French armyfell to La Palice, who had little interest in pursuing the retreatingSpanish forces, preferring instead to return to the siege of Ravenna.The city soon fell, and the French proceeded to thoroughly sackit. However, much of the French army was withdrawn to France followingthe battle, and La Palice was forced to extricate himself from Italy inAugust by renewed efforts on the part of the Holy League.
The Spanish forces in Italy were almost entirely destroyed at Ravenna, but Cardona would raise another army and appear in Lombardy in 1513.In the meantime, both Navarro and Colonna would see combat, Colonna incommand of an Italian army and Navarro in the service of Francis I of France.
[edit] Historiography[edit] Notes

• ^ Arnold, Renaissance at War, 166; Oman, Art of War, 134–138, 143; Taylor, Art of War,182–185, 206–207. Taylor relies primarily on the accounts byGuicciardini and Pandolfini for the positions of the units, and on theaccount by Sanuto for the numbers; he notes that Sanuto apparentlyrecords the official strength of each army, rather than the number ofmen actually present. Oman also notes that he follows Sanuto's numbers,as he considers them "more trustworthy than later details and figuresgiven by Guicciardini and others" (Oman, Art of War, 134).
• ^ Arnold, Renaissance at War, 166; Oman, Art of War, 134–135, 143; Taylor, Art of War, 182. Taylor gives the number of men in the vaward as 910.
• ^ Oman, Art of War,134–135, 143. Oman notes that the second group of French infantry wasactually part of the "main-battle" rather than the "vaward". Arnoldgives the identical positioning of units, but does not mention theirnumbers or commanders (Arnold, Renaissance at War, 166).
• ^ Taylor, Art of War, 183.
• ^ Oman, Art of War, 134; Taylor, Art of War, 182–183. Taylor names only Bohier as the commander, while Oman lists him together with the others.
• ^ Arnold, Renaissance at War, 166; Oman, Art of War, 134–136, 143; Taylor, Art of War,182–183, 207. Taylor notes that he follows Guicciardini's account inplacing the cavalry behind the main line. Oman acknowledges this pointby Guicciardini, but considers it "difficult to reconcile with thedetails of some of the later fighting given by other writers"; hebelieves that "it would seem more likely that they were in the truecentre of the array" (Oman, Art of War, 135–136).
• ^ Arnold, Renaissance at War, 166; Oman, Art of War, 134–136, 143; Taylor, Art of War, 183.
• ^ Oman, Art of War, 134–136, 143; Taylor, Art of War,183. According to Oman, the light cavalry included 300 Ferarresemounted arquebusiers, as well as French mounted crossbowmen and stradioti.Taylor also mentions the presence of about 1,000 dismounted archerswith the light cavalry; Oman includes a further 300 heavy cavalry underd'Alégre.
• ^ Oman, Art of War, 137.
• ^ Arnold, Renaissance at War, 166; Oman, Art of War, 137, 143; Taylor, Art of War, 184. The Papal cavalry was positioned close to the gap in the entrenchements near the riverbank.
• ^ Arnold, Renaissance at War, 166; Oman, Art of War, 137–138, 143; Taylor, Art of War, 184.
• ^ Taylor, Art of War,184. The Papal infantry is the third formation in the column, betweenthe last two Spanish divisions. According to Taylor, Carvajal's cavalrywas farther back than the last of these.
• ^ Arnold, Renaissance at War, 166; Oman, Art of War,137–138, 143. Oman notes that Guicciardini records the strength of thePapal infantry as 4,000, but considers it to be "probably anexaggeration". He gives a number of possibilities for the commander ofthe Papal troops: he was "a captain called Ramassot" according toFabrizio Colonna and Bayard, "Cornelio Romaeo of Bologna" according toKöchlein, and "Hernan Magote" according to Spanish sources; Omancomments that "he is otherwise unknown" (Oman, Art of War, 138).
• ^ Arnold, Renaissance at War, 166; Oman, Art of War, 137, 143; Taylor, Art of War, 184. Taylor gives the lower bound for the strength of the light cavalry, while Oman gives the higher.
• ^ Taylor, Art of War, 188.
• ^ Black, European Warfare, 73–74; Hall, Weapons and Warfare, 172; Oman, Art of War, 138; Taylor, Art of War,187–188. Taylor gives a number of figures from contemporary sources forthe length of the cannonade; according to Fabrizio Collonna, JacopoGuicciardini, Francesco Guicciardini, Coccinius, and the Rélacion,it lasted two hours, while Pandolfini and Floranges record it aslasting three. Black notes the cannonade's "unprecedented length"(Black, European Warfare, 74).
• ^ Hall, Weapons and Warfare, 172; Oman, Art of War, 138; Taylor, Art of War, 188.
• ^ Oman, Art of War, 138.
• ^ Arnold, Renaissance at War, 167; Hall, Weapons and Warfare, 172; Oman, Art of War, 138; Taylor, Art of War, 188–189.
• ^ Hall, Weapons and Warfare, 172; Oman, Art of War, 139; Taylor, Art of War, 189.
• ^ Oman, Art of War, 139; Taylor, Art of War,189. Oman cites the accounts by Coccinius, Bayard, and Floranges fordepictions of the casualties; he notes, however, that Coccinius is"rather propagandistic in praising the steadiness of his compatriots,and depreciating that of the French" (Oman, Art of War, 139).According to Oman, Coccinius and Bayard relate that Philip of Freiberg,the landsknechts' second-in-command, and a Gascon captain named DeMolard, were "cut in two by the same cannonball, as they were talkingtogether between their lines" (Oman, Art of War, 139). Hall merely notes that the French center was "pounded mercilessly" (Hall, Weapons and Warfare, 172).
• ^ Taylor, Art of War, 189.
• ^ Arnold, Renaissance at War, 167; Oman, Art of War, 138–139; Taylor, Art of War,209–210. The route taken by d'Este is unclear. Taylor notes that somecontemporary accounts, including Pandolfini and Castello, make mentionof guns that were moved from the French right to the French center, andthat Guicciardini assumes that it was the Duke of Ferrara who wasresponsible for the move. Taylor, however, believes that Giovio'saccount, which has d'Este maneuvering independently from the beginning,is more accurate, since his heavy cannon could not be moved across thebroken terrain immediately behind the French position. Oman echoes thisargument; he writes that, as "no 'point-to-point' movement waspossible", d'Este could not have been initially involved with thecannonade on the French right, and must have moved directly to hisfinal position after crossing the river (Oman, Art of War, 138–139).
• ^ Oman, Art of War, 138–139; Taylor, Art of War,190. Taylor cites Giovio for the account of d'Este causing casualtieson his own side; he notes it as indicating that the Ferrarese guns wereable to enfilade the entire length of the Spanish camp.
• ^ Arnold, Renaissance at War, 167; Hall, Weapons and Warfare, 172; Oman, Art of War, 139–140; Taylor, Art of War,189–190, 208. Arnold has d'Alègre move the guns later in the battle,after the cavalry engagement had begun; Hall attributes the move to theDuke of Ferrara instead of d'Alègre.
• ^ Oman, Art of War,139–140. Oman notes that Colonna, after his capture, related that hehad seen a single cannonball kill thirty-three of his men-at-arms.

[edit] References

• Arnold, Thomas F. The Renaissance at War. Smithsonian History of Warfare, edited by John Keegan. New York: Smithsonian Books / Collins, 2006. ISBN 0-06-089195-5.
• Baumgartner, Frederic J. Louis XII. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. ISBN 0-312-12072-9.
• Black, Jeremy. "Dynasty Forged by Fire." MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History 18, no. 3 (Spring 2006): 34–43. ISSN 1040-5992.
• ———. European Warfare, 1494–1660. Warfare and History, edited by Jeremy Black. London: Routledge, 2002. ISBN 0-415-27532-6.
• Guicciardini, Francesco. The History of Italy. Translated by Sydney Alexander. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. ISBN 0-691-00800-0.
• Hall, Bert S. Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, Technology, and Tactics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. ISBN 0-8018-5531-4.
• Mallett, M. E. and J. R. Hale. The Military Organization of a Renaissance State: Venice c. 1400 to 1617. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. ISBN 0-521-03247-4.
• Najemy, John M. A History of Florence: 1200–1575. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. ISBN 1-4051-1954-3.
• Norwich, John Julius. A History of Venice. New York: Vintage Books, 1989. ISBN 0-679-72197-5.
• Oman, Charles. A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century. London: Methuen & Co., 1937.
• Phillips, Charles and Alan Axelrod. Encyclopedia of Wars. Volume 2. New York: Facts on File, 2005. ISBN 0-8160-2851-6.
• Taylor, Frederick Lewis. The Art of War in Italy, 1494–1529. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973. First published 1921 by Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-8371-5025-6.

[edit] Further reading
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